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Abstract 
 
In the following review, the results from Fama and French (2001a) and Harry DeAngelo, Linda 
DeAngelo, and Douglas J. Skinner (2004) are replicated while the analysis was extended to a 
more recent period which included stock repurchases. I examined dividend concentration 
among US industrial firms over the 1985-2011 period whilst comparing the absolute changes 
from 2000 to 2011. I observed that the number of dividend payers increased by 16 firms from 
2000 to 2011, whereas aggregate dividend substantially increased by 124% during the same 
period of time. Furthermore, there was seemingly a stronger positive relation between level of 
earnings and dividend payments in 2011 compared to that of 2000. In this recent survey, level 
of earnings and share repurchases were seen as positively correlated during 1978 to 2011. My 
observations suggest of higher concentration of cash payout via stock repurchases over 1985-
2011, which indicates that firms with higher level of earnings spend more on share repurchases. 
Moreover, a very large proportion of share buy-back is completed by top dividend payers that 
distribute substantial portion of dividends. Such phenomenon has remained unchanged in the 
last decades. 
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1. Introduction and previous researches 
The main work of dividend policy provided by Miller and Modigliani (1961) initiated a wide 
body of literature which examined the payout policy in the US and other countries around the 
world. In this respect, and during dividend policy investigation, Fama and French (2001a) 
observations suggest that dividends had gradually disappeared with the large reduction in 
number of industrial firms that were paying dividends during 1978-1998 (67% of firms paid 
dividends in 1978 while only 21% did so in 1999).  
Fama and French (2001a) demonstrated that there are two main reasons that led to changes to 
dividend practices policy. First, change in population of publicly traded firms and second, 
decreased propensity of firms with characteristics in which shareholders would have expected 
them to pay dividends. Unlike the observations found by Fama and French (2001a), Shoven 
(1986) had conceded that the nominal dividend for the corporate segment, based on data 
offered by the US government, had nearly doubled over 1978-1985. Such conflicting findings 
encouraged H. DeAngelo et al.(2004)to conduct a new investigation, whereby the results 
demonstrated reduction in the number of dividend paying industrial firms by more than 1000 
(from 2250 to 926) over 1978-2000, and an increasing trend in aggregate dividends (224.6% in 
nominal and 22.7% in real terms) during the same period of time. H. DeAngelo et al.(2004) 
found that the main reduction in number of industrial firms occurs among those that paid the 
least dividends which has small impact on aggregate distribution, while at the same time largest 
dividend payers increased their payments. They showed that the largest 25 dividend payers 
paid 54.9% of aggregate supply and the 100 top payers supplied 81.8% of total dividends in 
2000.  
H. DeAngelo et al.(2004) have also shown that the majority of firms who have paid dividends 
generated a substantial level of earnings in 2000, an indication that the high dividends 
concentration may have been due to the increasing earnings concentration. Such outcome is 
consistent with Lintner's (1956) findings, which suggests that a firm's decision about dividend 
distribution is dependent upon the level of earning generation.  
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However, almost 50% of total industrial firms (2,144 firms) in 2000 reported $55 billion in 
losses. This finding was previously documented by Hayn(1995), Burgstahlerand 
Dichev(1997),Fama and French (2001b), and Ritter and Welch (2002). H. DeAngelo et al.(2004) 
reported a negative relationship between firms with losses and dividend payment. In this 
regards, they presented that most firms, mostly prominent technology firms, reported losses in 
2000, and thus failed to pay dividends. This finding is in parallel with the previous observations 
supported by DeAngelo and DeAngelo(1990)and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1992),who 
concede that losses have a bold role in dividend cut and deletion.  
H. DeAngelo et al.(2004) also documented that the percentage of dividends paid by industrial 
firms are positively correlated with the level of earnings, while such relationship was slightly 
weaker from 1978 to 2000. For instance, 97.7% of industrial firms with the real earnings of 
$100 million-plus paid dividends in 1978, whereas this proportion was 71.9% in 2000. This 
finding correlates with the report provided by Fama and French (2001a), who indicated a lower 
tendency of industrial firms to pay dividends.  
In yet another investigation to support the relationship between earnings and dividend 
payments, H. DeAngelo et al.(2004) documented that there is a two-tier structure for publicly 
traded firms. In the first tier, a small number of firms with very high level of earning generation 
dominate the aggregate dividend distribution. The second tier, though, which includes the 
majority of industrial firms, independently and together, make modest earning and supply a 
small proportion of aggregate dividend.  
After 2000, the global economy has encountered two major financial and economic events. The 
first event, known as "burst of dot.com bubble", and which occurred in 2000, is when the share 
prices increased rapidly and was subsequently followed by an abrupt fall down1 (Kindleberger, 
2001). The second major event, having taken place in September 2008, is recognized as "global 
financial downturn ". It is a time when we observed a sudden bankrupt of major US financial 
                                                          
1
 
1
For example the index of NASDAQ had a substantially growth up until March 2000 and then declined suddenly in 
the market (By MARTIN DUFWENBERGT, 2005).   
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institutions and major setback of stock markets in US (V.V. Chari, October 2008). With more 
than a decade past since the last data De Angelo had employed, it is an appropriate time to re-
examine and extend the findings of previous findings about earnings and dividend 
concentration of industrial firms in the US, mainly the trend of number of industrial firms 
paying dividends, the relationship between level of earnings and dividend distribution, and the 
propensity of firms to pay dividends.  
Grullon and Michaely ( 2002) and (McLaughlin, 2011) stated that although US companies 
preferred to pay cash to their investors in the form of dividends rather than share repurchases 
for an extended period of time, the last decades have seen a substantial growth of expenditure 
on share repurchases. Grullon and Michaely (2002) argue whether firm managers have changed 
their payout policy from dividends to share repurchases and if these two theories are 
interchangeable or not. In this sense, John and Williams (1985), Bernheim (1991) and Allen, 
Bernardo, and Welch (2000) previously demonstrated that when managers intend to signal a 
firm’s value, they pay dividends rather than buy back shares. Based on such conclusion, 
dividends and share repurchases are not interchangeable. On the contrary, Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) , Bhattacharya (1979), Easterbrook (1984), Miller and Rock (1985), and 
Jensen (1986) conceded that firms use payout in case of signal undervaluation or reduced 
agency conflict. According to this theory, dividends and share repurchases are interchangeable. 
Such considerable shift in industrial firms' payout policy generates a motivation for 
investigators to thoroughly employ a different approach to examine firms' performance on 
share repurchases using previous methods implemented for dividends. In addition, H.DeAngelo 
et al. (2004) assumed that there should be other available sources to substantiate that the most 
amount of stock repurchase conducted by small set of industrial firms have the majority of real 
earnings. There are three observations which are consistent with such concept. First, Linda and 
Sharpe (1999) reported notable volume of dollar repurchases for S&P 500 firms in the late 
1990s. Second, Fama and French (2001a) suggested firms that pay dividends are predisposed to 
repurchase stocks. Third, H.DeAngelo et al. (2004) demonstrated there is an earning 
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concentration among a group of firms producing the mass of industrial earnings and dividends 
and that these firms may also have a cash payout in terms of stock repurchases.  
In this present investigation, I follow H.DeAngelo et al. (2004) by extending the analysis in two 
dimensions. First I analyze the corporate dividend policy similarly conducted by DeAngelo et al 
(2004) while extending the time period to 2011. In particular, I compare the dividend policy in 
2011 versus 2000 motivated by the two events described earlier. In the second part, I examine 
how firms are structuring their payout policy by looking separately at share repurchases and 
dividend payments. To this end, I initially consider the longer trend of aggregate dividends paid 
by industrial firms over 1985-2011 and examine if aggregate dividends maintain its steady long-
run uptrend during 2000-2011. In this context, I also re-examine whether there is earnings 
concentration among the small number of firms contributing in supply dividends. Moreover, 
the relationship between level of earnings and paying dividends by industrial firms is inspected 
to assess if firms with higher level of earning generation have upper level of dividend payout 
ratio or not. 
In an attempt to assess the presumption previously documented by H.DeAngelo et al. (2004), I 
also analyze the existence of a potential relationship between firms’ earnings and their share 
repurchases. In doing so, I observe the track of number of firms with share repurchases from 
1978 to 2011 and moreover, I study whether small set of industrial firms with high levels of 
earnings are responsible for the majority of stock repurchases or not. Finally, I revise such 
assumption in connection to industrial firms paying dividends in order to observe the role of 
dividend payers and its impact on share repurchases.  
This thesis is provided in 6 sections. Hypotheses are represented in section 2 following the 
introduction and review of previous research about industrial firms' payout approaches. 
Methodology and data is explained in chapter 3 before the evaluation of the related data 
consistent with dividends in section 4 and share repurchase in section 5.Finally, section 6 
concludes findings of present investigation. 
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2. Hypothesis 
This study is provided in two main segments. In the first section, which mainly follows the 
methodology previously applied by H. DeAngelo et al. (2004), the hypotheses below are 
examined to link between industrial firms’ earnings and dividend payments over 2000-2011. 
H1: There is an earnings concentration among a small number of industrial firms  
H2: There is a positive relationship between the volume of dividends paid by industrial firms 
and the level of their earnings (There is a higher possibility that Industrial firms with higher level 
of earnings pay dividends). In this regard, a small number of firms with very high level of 
earnings distribute very large percentage of dividends. This leads to dividend concentration 
amongst a small number of firms with very high levels of earnings concentration.  
 H3: Aggregate dividends paid by industrial firms maintain its steady long-run uptrend over 
1978-2011 
In the second section, considering the hypotheses stated above, the performance of share 
repurchases completed by industrial firms will be examined. In addition, the follow hypotheses 
are assessed to examine industrial firms the relationship between industrial firms’ earnings and 
expenditure on share repurchases. 
H4: Since Firms that pay dividends generate a high level of real earnings, it is expected that such 
firms to have a main role in cash out in form of share repurchases 
H5: Firms with substantial volume of earnings are responsible for very large proportion of total 
cash payout in both forms of dividends and share repurchases 
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3. Methodology and Data 
In parallel with Fama and French (2001a) and H.DeAngelo et al. (2004) research studies, I utilize 
CRSP industrial firms with SIC codes beyond the ranges 4900–4949 (for financial firms) and 
6000–6999 (for utility firms) as a sample. Nonfinancial and nonutility firms are named  
‘‘industrials’’. I have placed particular emphasis on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms with CRSP 
share codes 10 or 11. I consider CRSP firms with common dividends and earnings before 
extraordinary, namely items 21 and 18, on compustat (The CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged 
Database)2. In order to examine the performance of industrial firms' payout policy via stock 
repurchase, I consider CRSP firms with PRSTKC items displaying purchase of common and 
preferred stock. Within such context, I examine trends over 1985-2011. 
First of all, I tried to follow data analysis completed by H.DeAngelo et al. (2004) during 1978-
2000. In this sense, I initially gathered all data for the time period 1978-2011. The samples used 
in my research study are differentiated by the number of firms found in WARDS due to the 
unavailability of SIC code in The CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged Database, thus providing no 
alternative but to derive the codes from Stock/Security Files with monthly observation and 
match them with CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged items.  
Surprisingly, even though there is a massive difference between numbers of firms, namely 
industrial, financial and utility from 1978-1985, the results obtained for aggregate dividends, 
aggregate earning, aggregate losses and total earning for dividend payers are quite close (there 
was a steady long-run uptrend in aggregate dividends paid by industrial firms in 1978-2000). 
Despite continuous effort to match data before 2000 in terms of number of industrial firms 
paying dividends, the new results do not correspond with that of De Angelo et al (2004) before 
1985. Using Consumer Price Index (CPI)3, all real values in 2000 and 2011 are converted to value 
                                                          
2
 From the data source “ Wharton Research Data Servuces” (WRDS) ,https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ 
3
 From U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/CPIAUCSL.txt 
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of 1985. In the second stage, I applied the same methodology used by De Angelo et al (2004) to 
obtain the trend of aggregate dividends paid by industrial firms from 2000 to 2011. 
In case of stock repurchases, consistent with industrial firm's performance in paying common 
dividends, I initially tried to use the values of Purchase of Common Stock item. This item was 
unavailable for a number of industrial firms, as such firms had announced their value of share 
repurchases in the name of Purchase of Preferred Stock. Hence, I utilized a common item 
amongst all industrial firms, namely Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock (Compustat item 
115).  
In the remainder of this present investigation, with particular consideration, I compare the 
latest version of data of 2011 with that of De Angelo et al (2004) derived in 2000. In addition, I 
also applied the data of 1985, as the year by which new results had corresponded with De 
Angelo et al (2004)’s findings, in an attempt to observe a longer trend of US industrial firms in 
the last three decades. 
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4. Sampling procedure and aggregate dividends, 1985-2011 
H.DeAngelo et al. (2004) found that while the number of industrial firms paying dividends 
decreased from 1978 to 2000, the number of financial/utilities firms paying dividends increased 
during the same period of time. H.DeAngelo et al. (2004) hold that such reduction is related to 
some core substantial changes considerably limited to industrial firms instead of managers’ 
tendency to pay dividends. As shown in table1, the number of industrial firms paying dividends 
has increased slightly by 1.87%, from 855 in 2000 to 871 in 2011, whereas the number of 
financial/utility firms paying dividends decreased by 19% from 1451 in 2000 to 998 in 2011. 
Apart from total earnings earned for industrial firms paying dividends, Figure 1 demonstrates 
the trend of earnings, losses, and aggregate dividends for industrial firms over 1978-2011. Such 
outline indicates that even though the aggregate earnings decreased between 2000-2001 and 
2007-2008, aggregate dividends slightly increased and maintained its uptrend over the full 
period 1978-2011. 
Table 2 displays that although US industrial firms experienced the highest losses in 2001 and 
2008, aggregate dividends did not reduce during these respective years. In this sense, when the 
value of aggregate earnings of industrial firms decreased by 100% (from $302.4 billion to -$3 
billion) and 50% ($577.3 billion to $289.6 billion) during 2000-2001 and 2007-2008 respectively, 
the value of total earnings of firms paying dividends decreased by 40% from $282.3 billion to 
$167.8 billion (for 2000-2001) and 21% from $425.5 billion to $336.2 billion (for 2007-2008). 
Additionally, the value of aggregate dividends declined by 3.6% from $102 billion in 2000 to 
$98.4 billion in 2001, while such value decreased by 13.3% from $222.3 to $192.7 over 2007-
2008. Moreover, dividends paid in 2001 comprises of 58.6% of total earnings of dividend 
payers. It is greater than dividends paid in each year before 1998, despite the aggregate 
industrial earnings being -$3 billion in 2001. In this regard, the value of aggregate dividends in 
2008 accounted for 57.3% of industrial aggregate earnings and 66.5% of total earnings of 
dividend payers respectively. As such, aggregate dividends in 2008 were greater than dividend 
payments in each year before 2007. 
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Table 1; Number of firms paid dividends during 1978–2011. The table includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms 
on CRSP that have CRSP share codes 10 or 11 allocated for each year. Industrial firms are defined as those with 
SIC codes beyond the ranges 4900–4949 whereas financial and utility companies present the ranges 6000–6999.  
 
  
14 
Table 2; Change in dividend and aggregate earnings over 1985-2011. The table includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and 
AMEX firms on CRSP that have CRSP share codes 10 or 11 allocated for each year. Industrial firms are defined as 
those with SIC codes beyond the ranges 4900–4949 whereas financial and utility companies present the ranges 
6000–6999. The sample is for firms for which Computsat has common dividends and earnings before 
extraordinary items (Compustat items 21 and 18).In last three columns, changing in related values is computed 
in terms of considering the relation between earning changes and dividend changes over 1985-2011. 
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As displayed in Figure 1, and during the period of 1978-2011, aggregate dividends paid by 
industrial firms maintained its steady long-run uptrend even in 2001 and 2008.  
Table 3 indicates that aggregate nominal dividends in 2011 increased by 115.8% for industrial 
firms from $102.1 billion in 2000 to $220.3 billion in 2011. In this sense, total real dividends 
increased by 65.9% from 2000 to 2011. Both the mean real dividends paid and median 
increased from 2000 to 2011 by 62.9% and 102.7% respectively. Row 6 shows that the 
percentage of all industrial firms paying dividends is 24.2% in 2000 and 30.7% in 2011 
respectively, which represents a 6.5% increase over this time phase. Although the percentage 
of number of NYSE firms paying dividend decreased by 8.6% and their total aggregate dividends 
fell by 12.5% from 2000 to 2011, these firms still pays the majority of industrial dividends.  
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Figure 1; Aggregate dividends, aggregate earnings, aggregate losses, and total earnings for dividend payers for industrial firm during 1978-2011, whereby 
particular emphasis is on NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms with CRSP assigned with share codes 10 or 11. Industrial firms are defined as those with SIC codes 
beyond the ranges 4900–4949 whereas financial and utility companies present the ranges 6000–6999. The sample is for firms for which Computsat has 
common dividends and earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat items 21 and 18). 
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Table 3; Aggregate dividends of industrial firms in 1985, 2000 and 2011. The sample includes NYSE, NASDAQ, 
and AMEX firms on CRSP assigned with share codes 10 or 11, and SIC codes beyond the ranges 4900–4949 and 
6000–6999. The sample is for firms for which Compustat reports dividends and earnings before extraordinary 
items (Compustat items 21 and 18) for each year. Using consumer price index to estimate real dividends in 2000 
and 2011, nominal dividends have been converted to 1985 dollars.  
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4.1. Dividends concentration and the increase therein over the last decade  
In Table 4, industrial firms paying dividends by cash dividends paid in 1985, 2000 and 2011 are 
graded in groups of 100 firms. In general, and as in 1985 and 2000, a small number of industrial 
firms pay a very large quantity of dividends in 2011. For instance, the top 100 payers supplied 
around 83% of total dividends in 2000, while this proportion was 81.7% for the same group in 
2011. However, the top 100 payers distributed $85.7 billion (to $220.3 billion in year 2011 
dollars) in real dividends in 2011, which is $21.7 billion more than total dividends paid (to $64 
billion in year 2011 dollars) by 855 industrial firms in 2000. There is a $32.7 billion increase in 
real dividends of the top 100 dividend payers from 2000 to 2011, which is threefold the $9.4 
billion rise in the total increase for all grades below the top 100 firms. In sum, the concentration 
of dividends paid is driven by a small number of firms which are placed in the top 200 payers, 
where this concentration remained unchanged over 2000-2011. 
Table 5 demonstrates the cross-sectional payments of dividends in 1985, 2000 and 2011, with 
dividend-paying firms classified by real dollar dividends paid, ranging from $500 million-plus to 
less than $1 million per year. It is shown that the number of industrial firms who have paid 
dividends over $100 million increased by 46 firms from 2000 to 2011, with an increase of $38.7 
billion in dividends. The number of firms with $500 million-plus in real dividends increased by 
20 firms with a $32.8 billion rise in real dividends over 2000-2011, which is 78.5% of the total 
increase in real dividends. On the other hand, the value of total dividends paid by industrial 
firms with less than $100 million increased only by $3 billion. From 2000 to 2011, although the 
number of firms with less than $5 million real dividends decreased by 96 firms, the total 
decrease in dividends for this group was $140 million, which is insignificant compared to the 
$38.7 billion increase of real dividends for firms placed in top categories (firms pay more than 
100 billion). The top categories, firms in excess of $ 100 million, comprise more firms in 2011 
compared to 2000, accounting for 87% of total dividends paid. 
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Table 4; Concentration of total dollar dividends paid by industrial firms in 1985, 2000 and in 2011. In 
descending order, the largest to smallest total dividends paid are shown. The table includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and 
AMEX firms on CRSP that have CRSP share codes 10 or 11 allocated for each year. Industrial firms are defined as 
those with SIC codes beyond the ranges 4900–4949 whereas financial and utility companies present the ranges 
6000–6999. The sample is for firms for which Computsat has common dividends and earnings before 
extraordinary items (Compustat items 21 and 18).For 2000, firms graded from 801 to 900 have 55 firms, while in 
2011, there were 871 firms (shown in corresponding row). 
 
 
The net result is that, in the last decade, the number of firms distributing a very large percent of 
dividends (firms with $100 million-plus real dividend) increases. Hence, top categories have 
more firms, while the number of firms with very small share in paying dividends (firms with less 
than $5 million real dividend) decreases. Such observation correlates the fact that top end firms 
dominate and have a huge impact on the aggregate dividend distribution, which eventually 
leads to substantial increase in aggregate dividends. (Harry DeAngeloa, 2004) 
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Table 5; Number of firms and real dividend payments in 1985, 2000 and in 2011. The sample includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms on CRSP assigned 
with share codes 10 or 11, and SIC codes beyond the ranges 4900–4949 and 6000–6999. The sample is for firms for which Compustat reports dividends and 
earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat items 21 and 18) for each year. Using consumer price index to estimate real dividends in 2000 and 2011, 
nominal dividends have been converted to 1985 dollars. 
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4.2. Dividends and earnings concentration and payout ratio over 2000-2011  
Table 6 presents the earnings of firms paying dividends in 1985, 2000 and 2011, similar to the 
format applied in Table 4. Over the last decade, similar to dividends, earnings concentration has 
remained in a very high level among the firms paying dividends. In this sense, 74% of aggregate 
real earnings are made by the top 100 dividend payers, while this proportion for the same 
category is 74.5% in 2000. The total real earnings of the 100 largest payers in 2011 increased 
from $131.9 billion in 2000 to $219.2 billion in 2011. This increase exceeds the total value of 
real earnings in 1985, which is $92 billion. In addition, the top 200 industrial firms paying 
dividends generated 87.9% of dividend payers' earnings in 2011, while the equivalent value for 
2000 is 86%. Overall, while the next two groups, namely 201-300 and 301-400, show the 
modest increase in real earnings, the remaining groups present a low increase or reduction in 
real earnings. In sum, the value of real earnings of dividend payers increased by 67% from $177 
billion in 2000 to $296.5 billion in 2011 (to $615 billion in year 2011 dollars). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.  
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Table 6; Earnings concentration of firms that paid dividends in 1985 , 2000 and in 2011. In descending order, 
the largest to smallest total dividends paid are shown. The table includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms on 
CRSP that have CRSP share codes 10 or 11 allocated for each year. Industrial firms are defined as those with SIC 
codes beyond the ranges 4900–4949 whereas financial and utility companies present the ranges 6000–6999. The 
sample is for firms for which Computsat has common dividends and earnings before extraordinary items 
(Compustat items 21 and 18).For 2000, firms graded from 801 to 900 have 55 firms, while in 2011, there were 
871 firms (shown in corresponding row). 
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4.3. The collective earnings distribution of dividend payers and non-payers 
Table 7 is designed to sum up the combination of cross-sectional earnings distribution of 
dividend payers and non-payers for analyzing the earnings of all industrial firms. The table is 
divided in two panels. Panel A shows collected earnings distribution for 1985, 2000 and 2011, 
while panel B includes the collected distribution of an average of five years’ earnings that 
ended in the mentioned years. In Panel B, the methodology of H. DeAngelo et al. (2004) study is 
applied, where Lintner’s (1956) analysis is implemented and implies that firms with several 
years of earnings have a tendency to pay dividends rather than firms with only a single year of 
earnings. The main reason that I have used a five-year average earning is because of the huge 
losses that industrial firms reported in 2001 and 2008. Table 7 also demonstrates earnings 
concentration among relatively few firms at the top end of distribution, whereas such 
concentration is higher in 2000 and 2011 compared to 1985.  
Panel A displays earnings concentration of firms with $500 million-plus real earnings slightly 
decreased in 2011 compared to that of 2000. Panel B, on the other hand, shows an increase in 
earnings concentration of such firms over 2000-2011. The number of firms and the value of real 
earnings increased for industrial firms with $50 million-plus real earnings. Such earnings 
decreased for firms with less than $50 million real earnings from 2000 to 2011. The 
combination of real earnings of dividend payers and non-payers increased from $189.7 billion in 
2000 to $375.6 billion in 2011 ($779.2 billion in year 2011 dollar), while the aggregate five-year 
real earnings increased from $154.1 billion to $280.3 billion. Firms with more than $500 million 
earnings played a significant role in increasing aggregate real earnings. Moreover, 81% of 
aggregate earnings in 2011 is generated by firms with $500 million-plus earnings in one year, 
while this proportion for a five year average earnings is 83%. Panel A demonstrates a total 
increase of $139.9 billion in one year earnings whereas panel B shows a total increase of $123.2 
billion in five year average earnings over 2000-2011. Additionally, firms with one-year positive 
earnings generated $409.4 billion in 2011, which is $156.9 billion more than it was in 2000, 
while firms with a positive average of five-year earnings generated $317.6 billion compared to 
that of 2000, which was $186.9 billion. 870 industrial firms with a total value of -$33.8 billion 
24 
reported losses in 2011 as against the negative earnings reported by 1282 firms in 2000, which 
accounted for -$62.7 billion. Such observation implies that the total loss in 2000 is almost twice 
as much as 2011.4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) and DenAgelo, DeAngelo , and Skinner (1992) conclude that losses most likely 
bring about the elimination of dividends. Such consequence, and with the consideration of recent years' reduction 
in losses in industrial firms, may provide an explanation of the increasing trend of number of industrial firms paying 
dividends in 2011 compared to 2000. 
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Table 7;Cross-sectional distributions of firms’ real earnings (1985 dollars) in 1985, 2000 and in 2011. Panel A 
presents the distributions of real earnings in 1985, 2000 and 2011. Panel B shows the distributions of five-year 
average real earnings ending in 1985, 2000 and in 2011. The sample is comprised of NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX 
firms on CRSP assigned with share codes 10 or 11 and SIC codes beyond the intervals 4900–4949 and 6000– 
6999. A firm is included only if Compustat reports dividends and earnings before extraordinary items 
(Compustat items 21 and 18). Using consumer price index to estimate real dividends in 2000 and 2011, nominal 
dividends have been converted to 1985 dollars. 
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4.4. Separate earnings of dividend payers and non-payers 
Table 8 exhibits the collected distribution of real earnings from table 7 and is classified in 
dividend payers and non-payers. A positive correlation between losses and the failure to pay 
dividends for 2011 is observed, as were reported in 1985 and 2000. Moreover, 92.7% and 
95.5% of firms who had reported losses in 2011 and 2000 respectively, failed to pay dividends. 
Although the number of industrial firms who had failed to pay dividends decreased from 2000 
to 2011, the real earnings of such firms increased from $12.6 billion to $79.1 billion during the 
same period. Furthermore, the value of real earnings of dividend payers increased from $177 
billion to $296.5 billion over 2000-2011. Over this time phase, real earnings of non payers in 
2011 increased by 527% compared to that of 2000, while this proportion is 67% for dividend 
payers during the same period. 
Table 8 also shows a positive relation between the proportion of firms that pay dividends and 
the level of their earnings. Such relation is stronger in 2011 compared to 2000. For instance, the 
number of firms paying dividends with earnings of $100 million-plus increased by 40.5% from 
220 in 2000 to 309 in 2011, while the number of dividend payers with earnings of $500 million-
plus increased by 71.8% from 39 to 67 over 2000-2011. The number of firms with earnings of 
less than $100 million that failed to pay dividends decreased by 11.5% from 635 firms in 2000 
to 562 firms in 2011. Overall, the number of industrial firms paying dividends in 2011 increased 
by 6.5%, an indication that a larger percent of firms with given level of real earnings pay 
dividends in 2011.This finding is in contrast with the conclusions of Fama and French's (2001a) 
and also DeAngelo, DeAngelo, Skinner (2004), who reported a lower propensity to pay 
dividends by industrial firms. As such, the increase in the number of firms paying dividends 
correspondingly caused an increase by $42.2 billion in aggregate real dividends in 2011 
compared to 2000. In this context, the percentage of industrial dividend payers with $500 
million-plus earnings in 2011 increased by 71.8%. This led to a substantial increase in the real 
earnings of this category from $112.1 billion in 2000 to $207.3 billion in 2011. 
In sum, even though the percentage of total earnings of firms paying dividends decreased from 
93.3% in 2000 to 78.9% in 2011, the number of such firms with a very large level of positive 
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earnings (more than $100 million) increased, whereas the number of firms with small level of 
earnings (less than $100 million) decreased during the same period. As such, it seems likely that 
the propensity of such top earners to pay dividend continues over 2000-2011. All such factors 
have led the aggregate real dividends to increase in 2011. 
 
4.5. Payout ratio and tendency to pay dividend:  
In this section, and consistent with Fama and French (2001a) and H.DeAngelo et al’s. (2004) 
research study, I have examined the propensity of industrial firms to pay dividends in 2011. 
Table 9 shows several ratios regarding the proportion of firm's earnings they used to supply 
dividends. Row 1 demonstrates a slight decrease in the ratio of aggregate dividends to 
aggregate earning of payers and non payers combined from 1985 to 2000 and then from 2000 
to 2011. From 1985 to 2000, this proportion declined from 50.2% to 33.7% and from 33.7% to 
28.1% from 2000 to 2011 when one-year earnings were considered. With regards to five-year 
earnings, such ratio decreased from 48.6% to 41.4% from 1985 to 2000, and from 41.4% to 
37.4% from 2000 to 2011. The main reason of this reduction is the notable increase in value of 
real earnings of non-payers, most particular in top earners. For example, the percentage of 
dividend payers with $1 billion-plus earnings increased by 85% from 2000 to 2011, while this 
ratio for non-payers with the same characteristics was 105%.  
The ratio of aggregate dividends to the total earning of dividend payers and also the median of 
individual firms payout ratio are presented in row 2 and row 3 respectively. Rows 4.1 and 4.2, 
using total dividends to total earnings of these dividend payers, report the same statistics for 
the constant composition of 413 firms that paid dividends in both 1985 and 2011 and also 573 
firms that paid dividends in both 2000 and 2011. Rows 5.1 and 5.2 consider the same constant 
composition of median payout ratio. 
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Table 8; Real earnings (1985 dollars) of industrial firms which is separated to payers and non-payers in 1985, 2000 and in 2011. Panel A presents the 
distributions of real earnings in 1985, 2000 and 2011. Panel B shows the distributions of five-year average real earnings ending in 1985, 2000 and in 2011. 
The sample is comprised of NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms on CRSP assigned with share codes 10 or 11 and SIC codes beyond the intervals 4900–4949 and 
6000– 6999. A firm is included only if Compustat reports dividends and earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat items 21 and 18). Using consumer 
price index to estimate real dividends in 2000 and 2011, nominal dividends have been converted to 1985 dollars. The ‘‘percentage from payers’’ columns 
report the percent of total earnings that comes from dividend-paying firms.  
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Table 9; Aggregate and median dividend payout ratios for industrial firms on CRSP/Compustat, 1985, 2000 and 
2011.The sample is comprised of NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms on CRSP assigned with share codes 10 or 11 
and SIC codes beyond the intervals 4900–4949 and6000– 6999. A firm is included only if Compustat reports 
dividends and earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat items 21 and 18). 
 
 
On the whole, table 9 demonstrates minimal changes in ratios over the last decade. Row 2 
reports that based on one-year real earnings, the ratio of aggregate dividends to total earnings 
of dividend payers decreased by 0.4% from 36.1% in 2000 to 35.6% in 2011, while this ratio 
declined by 0.3% from 45% in 2000 to 44.7% in 2011 based on a five-year average real earnings. 
Row 3 shows that based on single year's earnings, the median payout ratio increased by 4.1% 
from 23.7% in 2000 to 27.8% in 2011, and based on five-year average earnings it reduced by 
0.7% from 26.9% to 27.6% over 2000-2011.The constant composition sample of firms paying 
dividends in 1985 and 2011 is demonstrated in row 4.1, and the constant composition sample 
of firms paying dividends in 2000 and 2011 is shown in row 4.2. In this regard, row 4.1 shows a 
reduction of 7.5% and 2.1% based on one-year and five-year average earnings respectively, 
whereas row 4.2 exhibits a 5.2% increase based on single year's earnings and an 8.3% increase 
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when considering five-year average real earnings. With regards to change in median firms 
payout ratios in rows 5.1 and 5.2, all ratios increased as observed. In sum, except for the 
significant increase in row 5.2, no substantial change (up or down) in the payout ratio of firms 
paying dividends was observed over the last decade. 
 
4.6. The identity of the top payers, non-payers, and earners in 2011 
Table 10 and 11 (see Appendix) show the top industrial firms that contributed in the 
distribution of the largest dividends and generated the majority of earnings in 2011 and 2000 
respectively. Both tables demonstrate that old-line industrial firms such as AT&T, Exxon Mobil, 
and General Electric were the principal dividend providers in 2000 and 2011. The top 62 payers 
in table 10 supplied 71.1% of total industrial dividends and generated $188.3 billion in real 
earnings ($390.6 billion in 2011 dollar), which is 50.1% of aggregate industrial earnings. It 
presents a $38.5 billion increase in real dividends and $76.5 billion rise in real earnings for such 
dividend payers over 2000-2011. Although there is a slight decrease in these top payers’ 
contribution in earning generation in 2011 compared to 2000, it seems their share in dividend 
distribution considerably increased (from 57.8% to 71.1%) over the same period. Considering 
the trend of 62 top dividend payers in 2011, their contribution in dividend payments has an 
upward trend and increased from 1985 to 2000 and then from 2000 to 2011, while their share 
in earning creation experienced a growth from 1985 to 2000 and then a very slight reduction 
over 2000-2011. 
Table 11 shows the top 37 payers which as a group distributed 64.1% of aggregate industrial 
dividends and generated 50.5% of total aggregate real earnings in 2000. There was an increase 
of $21.9 billion and $57.1 billion in real dividends and real earnings respectively over 1985-
2000. 
Overall, a greater number of total industrial dividend payers generate the majority of real 
earnings in 2011 as against that of 2000, which explains the slight decrease in earnings 
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concentration over 2000-2011. On the other hand, 62 top dividend payers supplied 71% of total 
dividends in 2011, whereas in 2000, 37 top payers distributed 64% of total dividend payments. 
Tables 12 and 13 demonstrate earnings concentration among top 25 non-payers for 2011 and 
2000 respectively. Both tables are graded by highest earnings and report cumulative earnings 
as a percentage of total earnings of non-payers with positive earnings. Firms that reported $1 
billion-plus real earnings in 2011 accounted for 35.4% of all positive earnings of non-payers, 
while this proportion was 27% in 2000. In table 12, the top 10 firms accounted for 33.3% and 
the top 25 firms generated 42.4% of such earnings and only 50 companies as non-payers 
accounted for the majority (50.2%, not reported in table 12). As for 2000, the corresponding 
figures are observable in table 13. 
Having scanned through the identity of the top 25 non-payers, it is obvious that a group of 
technology firms are responsible for the majority of non-payers in 2011, as had happened in 
2000. In addition to the three companies as main non-payers in 2000 – Apple, Dell, and EMC–
with more than $1 billion in real earnings, there are also some other technology firms like 
Google, eBay, and Yahoo seen amongst non-payers of 2011. On the other hand, Microsoft, 
which had the highest earnings amongst non-payers in 2000, began to supply dividends in 2003 
and is ranked 9th in 2011's top payers. 
Table 13 also presents that the thirteen firms of 25 top non-payers in 2000 began to pay 
dividends during 2000-2011 and eleven of them continued to do so until 2011. Amongst non-
payers that started supplying dividends in 2000, two companies, namely Sprint Nextel and Avis 
Budget Group, distributed dividends only during the period of 2002-2007 and 2004-2006 
respectively, after which they cut their dividends. Considering the top 25 non-payers in 2000, 
the dividend value of four firms are unavailable in 2011 because of acquisition and eight firms 
have yet to start paying dividends. As a whole, 62% of top nonpayers in 2000 that existed in 
2011 had dividend payments in 2011. 
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Table 10; Earnings for the 25 industrial firms have not paid dividend in 2011, with the highest reported 
earnings in 2011.Real earnings are nominal earnings in 2011 converted to 1985 dollars using the consumer price 
index. All earnings figures are before extraordinary items.  
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Table 11; Earnings for the 25 industrial firms have not paid dividend in 2011, with the highest reported 
earnings in 2011.Real earnings are nominal earnings in 2011 converted to 1985 dollars using the consumer price 
index. All earnings figures are before extraordinary items. The last two columns report the situation of these top 
non-payers in terms of their dividend in 2011.In fifth column , the numbers which are highlighted by red colors 
shows the year of cut dividend with related companies (Sprint Nextel and Avis Budget Group).All earnings 
figures are before extraordinary items.  
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Table 14 (see Appendix) exhibits the 76 firms, including both dividend payers and non-payers, 
that generated more than $1 billion real earnings in 2011. The combination of these 76 firms 
accounted for 64% of aggregate industrial earnings in 2011 and amongst such firms, 65 of them  
as dividend payers paid 68.4% of total dividends. Table 15 (see Appendix) reports that 49 
companies in 2000 with the same level of real earnings generated 69.2% of aggregate industrial 
real earnings and 39 of them supplied 60.2% of real dividends. It shows that over 2000-2011, 
despite of the substantial increase in the number of industrial firms with more than $1 billion in 
real earnings (from 49 to 76), these firms had slightly less share in earnings generation but 
more contribution in dividend distribution.   
On the whole, as DeAngelo et al. (2004) argued, there are two-tier structures based on earnings 
in 2011. As such, few industrial firms generated the majority of real earnings and distributed 
the most dividends, while a small portion of earnings and dividends is distributed jointly by a 
large number of firms.  
Table 16 documents the relationship between the level of real earnings and dividend payments 
by industrial firms and also shows that dividends is more concentrated in 2011 compared to 
2000. Cumulatively, firms with more than $500 million-plus real earnings supplied 79.5% of 
total dividends in 2011 as against 69.5% obtained in 2000. 
With regards to earnings concentration, 62 industrial firms (around 2% of all industrial firms) 
generated the majority of real earnings and distributed 71.1% of total dividends in 2011, while 
37 firms  (1% of all industrial firms), which generated the largest part of real earnings in 2000, 
supplied 64.1% of total dividends. As displayed in table 7, 1506 firms, or 53.1% of all industrial 
firms, earned less than or equal to $10 billion in 2011. Such firms, as exhibited in table 15, paid  
$2.5 billion or 2.4% of total industrial dividends, while more than half of this amount is 
distributed by six firms that had sustained losses in 2011 (including Anadarko Petroleum, Best 
Buy, Donnelley (RR) & Sons, Huntington Ingalls, Sycamore Networks, and Vanguard Health 
System). Additionally, the top 62 industrial dividend payers supplied $75.5 billion of total 
dividends in 2011, which is 30 times larger than that paid by small earners (firms with less than 
or equal to $10 million in real earnings). Compared to 2000, there are some differences in 
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numbers of industrial firms and dividend payments. In this context, only 1% of total industrial 
firms (37 in number) that generated the majority of real earnings (50.5%) paid $41 billion or 
64.1% of total dividends in 2000. Table 7 also reports that 64.6% of total number of industrial 
firms (2286 in number) with $10 billion or less in real earnings paid $3.2 billion or 5% of total 
dividends. It is worth noting that only five firms, namely Wyeth, Penney, Xerox, and Qwest 
Communication, and Lanier Worldwide, distributed 52.8% of total dividends paid by small 
earners (firms with less than or equal to $10 million in real earnings). 
 
39 
Table16; Real earnings (1985 dollars) and dividend paid for industrial firms in 1985, 2000 and in 2011: Sample of dividend payers 
The distribution of real earnings in 1985, 2000 and in 2011 is reported. The sample is comprised of NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms on CRSP assigned with 
share codes 10 or 11 and SIC codes beyond the intervals 4900–4949 and 6000– 6999. A firm is included only if Compustat reports dividends and earnings 
before extraordinary items (Compustat items 21 and 18). Using consumer price index to estimate real dividends in 2000 and 2011, nominal dividends have 
been converted to 1985 dollars. 
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5. Sampling procedure and aggregate share repurchases, 1978-2011 
Table 17 shows that there is a large increase in the number of firms with share repurchase from 
1985 to 2011 for both industrial firms by 63.5% and financial/utility firms by 146.2%. It should 
be noted that industrial firms had already reached their highest rise by 94.9% from 824 firms in 
1985 to 1606 firms in 1999, while financial/utility firms arrived at their peak by 228.3% from 
184 firms in 1985 to 604 in 2007. Unlike table 1 that shows a total decrease in number of 
industrial firms and an increase for financial/utility firms paying dividends over 1985-2011, 
table 17 displays that there is a total increase for both industrial and financial/utility firms that 
have cash out in forms of share repurchases and dividends together during the same period.  
The main reason of this considerable growth is not clear. Yet, findings of Young (1969) and 
Wansley, and Lane and Sarkar (1989) concede that a company can have 29 different reasons 
executing the buy-back of its stocks, some important of which are documented as a signal by 
management of future confidence, an increase in the firm’s leverage, excess cash, the providing  
of shares for employee bonus/retirement plans, a substitute for cash dividends, part of a 
defensive strategy to avoid a takeover, and lack of sufficient investment opportunities.  
  
42 
Table 17; Number of firms paid have cash payout via stock repurchase over 1978–2011. The table 
includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms on CRSP that have CRSP share codes 10 or 11 allocated for each year. 
Industrial firms are defined as those with SIC codes beyond the ranges 4900–4949 whereas financial and utility 
companies present the ranges 6000–6999.  
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Moreover, Fenn and Liang (2001) found that there is a positive relation between stock buyback 
and management stock options, while such relation in terms of dividend payments, as 
suggested by Lambert (1989), is negative. 
Figure 2 demonstrates aggregate cash payout via stock repurchases, aggregate earnings, 
aggregate losses, and aggregate earnings of industrial firms with share repurchase for industrial 
firms of  CRSP/Compustat over 1978-2011. It is shown that except for 2001 and 2008, aggregate 
stock repurchases perform exactly as a function of aggregate earnings. Hence, when the 
earnings is increasing over the years, stock repurchases also rises and vice versa. In 2001, the 
aggregate earnings is -$2.98 billion, while the value of share buyback is $124.9 billion. The 
corresponding values for 2008, though, are $289.6 billion and $371.7 billion for aggregate 
earnings and share buyback respectively. 
It also displayed that even though aggregate real earnings and total stock repurchase moved in 
a parallel rout, the gap between their absolute changes over 1978-2011 has increased 
substantially. In this context, the value of stock repurchases is $73.3 billion, less than aggregate 
earnings in 1978, while in 2011, it was $361.4 billion. On the other hand, while the value of 
total share repurchases is only 4.7% of aggregate real earnings in 1978, this proportion is 53.6% 
in 2011. This observation indicates that, although the absolute space between stock buyback 
and aggregate earnings increased over the last three decades, the proportion of aggregate 
share repurchases to aggregate earnings increased significantly from 1978 to 2011.  
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5.1. Share repurchases versus dividends 
In the context of this section, I compare the performance of industrial firms in terms of share 
repurchases in 1985 and 2011, since the former is consistent with the beginning date of my 
observations while the latter includes the latest data.  
As figure 2 demonstrates, aggregate cash payout via share repurchases for industrial firms had 
experienced a slight increase before 2000. From 2000 onwards, there was a substantial growth 
in aggregate cash payout by 181.1%, from $148.6 billion to $417.7 billion, in 2011 compared to 
that of 2000. It had reached its peak in 2007 with $544.1 billion.  
Figure 3 follows a path of industrial share repurchases and total share repurchases of dividend 
payers over 1978-2011. It demonstrates that a majority of share repurchases is completed by 
dividend payers. Although a huge majority of aggregate share repurchases is paid by dividend 
payers over 1985-2011, as reported in table 18,  this proportion decreased slightly from 96.8% 
in 1985 to 79.8% in 2011.  
Table 18 documents that from 1997 to 2011, except for 2009, the value of share repurchases is 
more than dividends. Such result seemingly supports the fact that US industrial firms have more 
propensity to return cash to their shareholders in form of stock repurchase rather than 
dividends (Fama and Frencha (2001); Grullon and Michaely (2002), Skinner (2008)). It also 
shows that whenever industrial firms sustained huge aggregate losses, dividend payers paid 
cash in form of dividends rather than share repurchases. For example, following a massive loss 
of -$294.3 billion in 2001, the value of dividends grew more than share repurchases over 2001-
2003. In addition, and in 2008, when the total loss was -$364.6 billion, the value of dividends 
was greater than that of share repurchases in 2009. 
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Figure 2; Aggregate share repurchases, aggregate earnings, aggregate losses, and total earnings for dividend payers for industrial firm during 1978-2011, 
whereby particular emphasis is on NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms with CRSP assigned with share codes 10 or 11. Industrial firms are defined as those with 
SIC codes beyond the ranges 4900–4949 whereas financial and utility companies present the ranges 6000–6999. The sample is for firms for which 
Computsat have common dividends, Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock, and earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat items 21, 115 and 18). 
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Table 128; Comparing dividends and share repurchases over 1978-2011.The table includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms on CRSP that have CRSP share 
codes 10 or 11 allocated for each year, and SIC codes beyond  the ranges 4900–4949 and 6000–6999. The sample is for firms for which Computsat have 
common dividends, Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock, and earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat items 21, 115 and 18). In last two 
columns indicates whether the value of dividend is bigger that of share repurchase for total industrial firms and also dividend payers respectively over 
1985-2011.  
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Figure 4 demonstrates industrial aggregate dividends, industrial aggregate earnings for dividend 
payers, aggregate share repurchases completed by dividend payers, and sum of share 
repurchases and dividends completed by dividend payers. It illustrates the situation of total 
cash payout in both forms of dividends and share repurchases by dividend payers. It is seen 
that total cash payout distributed by dividend payers in both forms of dividends and share 
repurchasse increased substantially from $87.1 billion to $546.5 billion over 1985-2011. Sixty 
percent of 2011's total cash out value comprises share repurchases while such value for 1985 is 
46%. Such observation seemingly suggests an increased propensity of industrial firms to share 
repurchases rather than dividend payments over 1985-2011.  
In sum, figure 2, 3 and 4 and table 17 demonstrate (1) total share repurchases performs as a 
function of aggregate earnings over 1978-2011, except for 2001 and 2008, (2) the massive 
amount of industrial earnings is generated by the firms that pay cash via stock repurchases (3) 
dividend payers account for the huge volume of industrial total share repurchases in all years, 
although this volume somewhat decreased over 1978-2011 and (4) industrial firms with no 
payment in dividends may have a returning cash in form of share repurchases. 
Table 19 and table 20 illustrate the performance of industrial firms in paying cash via share 
repurchases for all industrial firms and also industrial dividend payers over 1985-2011 
respectively. Row 1 in table 19 reports that aggregate nominal stock repurchases in 2011 
increased by more than 9 times (913.1%) for CRSP/Compustat industrial firms, from $41 billion 
in 1985 to $418 in 2011, and aggregate real value of share repurchases, shown in row 2, 
increased by 388.4% from 1985 to 2011. Row 3 and row 4 show that the mean real cash payout 
on stock repurchases rose from $50 million in 1985 to $149.5 million in 2011, while the median 
increased from $1.2 million to $10.1 million in the given years respectively. The difference 
between median and mean and also the huge extension of this difference over 1985-2011 
seemingly indicates a considerable concentration in terms of share repurchases amongst 
industrial firms. 
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Figure 3; Aggregate share repurchase and aggregate share repurchase completed by dividend payers whereby particular emphasis is on NYSE, NASDAQ, 
and AMEX firms with CRSP assigned with share codes 10 or 11. Industrial firms are defined as those with SIC codes beyond the ranges 4900–4949 whereas 
financial and utility companies present the ranges 6000–6999. The sample is for firms for which Computsat have common dividends, Purchase of Common 
and Preferred Stock, and earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat items 21, 115 and 18). 
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Figure 4; Aggregate share repurchase, aggregate share repurchase by dividend payers, sum of share repurchase and dividend (total cash out) by dividend 
payers and total earnings for dividend payers, whereby particular emphasis is on NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms with CRSP assigned with share codes 10 
or 11. Industrial firms are defined as those with SIC codes beyond the ranges 4900–4949 whereas financial and utility companies present the ranges 6000–
6999. The sample is for firms for which Computsat have common dividends, Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock, and earnings before extraordinary 
items (Compustat items 21, 115 and 18). 
 
  
50 
As shown in row 7 and row 8, NYSE firms accounted for 53.5% of all industrial firms with share 
repurchases and 95% of dollar value of such firms in 1985, while such proportions decreased to 
46.8% and 68.8% in 2011 respectively. This reduction likely demonstrates more firms that list 
and trade their shares in NASDAQ and AMEX have a tendency now to buy back their shares. 
However, as already reported in table 3, the contribution of NYSE industrial firms have reduced 
in both forms of cash out including dividends and share repurchases over the last decade. This 
may suggest the probability that industrial firms who have become older and more stable in 
NASDAQ and AMEX in recent years have generated a higher level of earnings and greater value 
of share repurchases.  
As regards the proportion of share repurchases completed by dividend payers, 96.8% and 
78.8% were accounted for in 1985 and 2011 respectively (Table 20).This reduction is consistent 
with the decrease in proportions displayed in row 4, from 64.2% in 1985 to 42.2% in 1985. On 
the other hand, row 5 shows that the proportion of dividend payers with share repurchases to 
total industrial dividend payers increased in number by 23.7% (from 41.6% to 65.3%). 
Accordingly, row 6 demonstrates that the proportion of aggregate share repurchases to total 
cash payout of dividend payers increased by 14.1% (from 45.8% to 59.9%) from 1985 to 2011.  
In sum, the number of firms that have a tendency to expend on share repurchases increased 
over 1985-2011. Correspondingly, although the proportion of dividend payers that also 
repurchased shares to all industrial firms with share buy-back has decreased in terms of 
number and dollars in 2011 compared to 1985, the proportion of such dividend payers to all 
industrial dividend payers increased in the same period. These observations may likely suggest 
that in 2011, not only did considerable number of firms prefer to pay cash via stock repurchases 
rather than dividend payments, but the majority (65.3%) of dividend payers also contributed in 
share repurchasing. In this regard, 59.9% of total cash payouts, including dividends and share 
repurchases together was spent on share buyback in 2011, while such amount was 45.8% in 
2000. 
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Table 19; Aggregate share repurchase in 1985 and 2000. The table includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms on 
CRSP that have CRSP share codes 10 or 11 allocated for each year, and SIC codes beyond the ranges 4900–4949 
and 6000–6999. The sample is for firms for which Computsat have common dividends, Purchase of Common and 
Preferred Stock, and earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat items 21, 115 and 18). Using consumer 
price index to estimate real share repurchases in 2011, nominal share repurchases have been converted to 1985 
dollars. 
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Table 20; Aggregate share repurchase for dividend payers in 1985 and 2000. The table includes NYSE, NASDAQ, 
and AMEX firms on CRSP that have CRSP share codes 10 or 11 allocated for each year, and SIC codes beyond the 
ranges 4900–4949 and 6000–6999. The sample is for firms for which Computsat have common dividends, 
Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock, and earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat items 21, 115 
and 18). Using consumer price index to estimate real share repurchases in 2011, nominal share repurchases have 
been converted to 1985 dollars. 
 
5.2. Share repurchases concentration and the decrease therein over the last 
three decades 
Table 21 ranks industrial firms with expenditure on share repurchase in 1985 and 2011 in group 
of 100 firms. For each group ranked in each year, the first four columns report the percentage 
of total cash payout on stock repurchase, the middle four columns demonstrate the cumulative 
percentage and the last four columns report total value of real share repurchases. In each 
group, both the role of total industrial firms and dividend payers are examined. Although a 
minority of industrial firms relatively paid on the majority of share repurchases, this 
concentration gradually decreased over 1985-2011. The main reason may be attributed to the 
increase of total number of industrial firms that paid cash on share repurchases.  
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Table 21; Concentration of total dollar share repurchases completed by industrial firms in 1985 and in 2011Firms are ranked from the largest to smallest 
total dollar share repurchases. The table includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms on CRSP that have CRSP share codes 10 or 11 allocated for each year, and 
SIC codes beyond the ranges 4900–4949 and 6000–6999. The sample is for firms for which Computsat have common dividends, Purchase of Common and 
Preferred Stock, and earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat items 21, 115 and 18).  For 1985, firms graded from 801 to 900 have 24 firms. 
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For instance, the top 100 industrial firms accounted for 92.6% of total share repurchases in 
1985, while this amount for top 100 payers dropped to 70.8% in 2011. However, the top 100 
firms paid $142.5 billion (to $295.7 billion in year 2011 dollars) on share repurchases in 2011, 
which exceeds the $41.2 billion stock repurchases completed by all 824 industrial firms in 1985. 
It is observed that after three decades there may be a tangible concentration in number of 
firms with share repurchases, as 85% of total value of real stock repurchases is driven by the 
top 200 industrial firms in 2011. Furthermore, while dividend payers repurchased 96.8% of total 
shares in 1985, this percentage decreased to 78.8% in 2011. Correspondingly, the cash payout 
distributed by the top 200 dividend payers in form of share repurchase decreased from 85.2% 
in 1985 to 69.4% in 2011. Overall, although the share repurchase concentration among 
dividend payers decreased over 1985-2011, the majority of share repurchases are still being 
completed by firms paying dividends. In terms of expenditure on share repurchases, though, 
569 firms as dividend payers spent $158.7 billion in 2011 as against $39.9 billion paid by 529 
dividend payers in 1985.  
Table 22 demonstrates the cross-sectional of share repurchases in 1985 and 2011. Firms with 
stock repurchases are classified by real dollar cash payout, which ranges from $500 million-plus 
to less than $1 million per year in two panels. Panel A documents that the number of firms with 
share repurchases increased by 517 from 822 to 1339 over 1985-2011, while the value of total 
share repurchases increased by $160.1 billion from $41.1 billion in 1985 to $201.3 billion in 
2011. Correspondingly, the number of firms with share repurchase of $100 million-plus 
increased by 239 and the value of share repurchases of such firms increased by $149.3 billion 
over 1985-2011. The number of firms with less than $100 million increased by 278, whereas the 
value of share repurchases increased by $10.8 billion during the same period of time. 
Additionally, the number of firms with less than $5 million decreased by three companies over 
1985-2011, while the total outflow on share buy-back for such firms increased by $179 million.  
Overall, 92% of share repurchases in 2011 is completed by firms with $100 million-plus 
expenditure on stock buy-back and this value increased by 5.1% compared to 1985. On the 
other hand, the contribution of firms with less than $100 million in share repurchases 
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decreased by 5.1% over 1985-2011. These observations may imply that share repurchases are 
more concentrated amongst firms with high level of cash payout on share buyback rather than 
those with lower levels of cash out. 
Panel B demonstrates the main role of top dividend payers in cash payout via stock 
repurchases. It reports that the number of firms with $500 million-plus dividends that also 
contributed in share repurchases increased by 27 companies over 1985-2011. Also, the number 
of dividend payers with more than $100 million dividends that contributed in share repurchases 
increased by 73 firms. On the other hand, the number of firms with less than $100 million real 
dividends and those with less than $5 million real dividends reduced by 25 and 175 
respectively. Accordingly, the real share repurchases for very top dividend payers, with more 
than $500 million real dividends, increased by more than eight times from $8.4 billion in 1985 
to $76.5 billion in 2011. All in all, firms with $100 million-plus real dividends increased by 
378.5% in share repurchases during 1985-2011, while the remainder of dividend payers had an 
increase of 95% in share repurchases. 
In sum, we can observe that the number of firms with stock repurchases increased in all 
categories, especially in very top categories with $500 million-plus. These firms now pay 
substantially more cash on share buyback. With regards to dividend payers contributing in 
share repurchases, the top dividend payers (with more than $100 million dividend) have the 
most significant role in share buy-back, having repurchased 66% and 65% of total shares in 
1985 and 2011 respectively. These observations may suggest that a very large portion of share 
buy-back is completed by top dividend payers and the firms with high level of earnings that 
distributed a substantial portion of dividends also have a significant role in share repurchases. 
Additionally, and consistent with the reduction in number of industrial firms with less than $100 
million dividends over 1985-2011, the proportion of share repurchase of such firms to total 
share buy-back decreased from 30.8% to 14% during the same period .   
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5.3. Stock repurchases and earnings concentration and payout ratios  
In this segment, I examine the relation between earnings concentration and share repurchases 
concentration. Similar to the format of table3, table 23 grades the firms with stock repurchases 
by their earnings in 1985 and 2011. The 100 top firms that paid cash in form of stock 
repurchases generated 77% earnings of all payers in 1985, while the top 200 firms cumulatively 
accounted for 88%. In 2011, though, the top 100 firms produced 66.1% earnings of all payers, 
whereas the top 200 firms collectively combined for 75.6% earnings. Earnings of top 100 largest 
payers increased substantially by $156.3 billion from $38.5 billion in 1985 to $194.8 billion in 
2011. All remaining groups also show a growth in real earnings in 2011. Although there is a high 
earning concentration in both 1985 and 2011, this concentration decreased in 2011 compared 
to 1985. This suggests that in recent years, more firms have the propensity to repurchase their 
shares even those with low earnings. Overall, aggregate real earnings of firms who paid on 
stock repurchases considerably increased by 488% from $50.1 billion in 1985 to $294.9 billion in 
2011 (to $611.7 billion in year 2000 dollars). 
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Table 22; Panel A reports real payment via stock repurchase by total industrial firms. Panel B reports real payment via stock repurchase by dividend 
payers. The table includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms on CRSP that have CRSP share codes 10 or 11 allocated for each year, and SIC codes beyond the 
ranges 4900–4949 and 6000–6999. The sample is for firms for which Computsat have common dividends, Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock, and 
earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat items 21, 115 and 18). Using consumer price index to estimate real share repurchases in 2011, nominal 
share repurchases have been converted to 1985 dollars.  
Panel A: Number of firms and real share repurchase in 1985 and 2011 for samples of industrial firms that paid given amounts of real Purchase of 
Common and Preferred Stock ($ millions, 1985 dollars) 
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Panel B: Number of firms and real share repurchase in 1985 and 2011 for samples of industrial firms that paid given amounts of real dividend and real 
Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock simultaneously ($ millions, 1985 dollars) 
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Table 23; Concentration of earnings of industrial firms that paid cash in form of stock repurchase in 1985 and 
in 2011.Firms are ranked from the largest to smallest total dollar paid for share repurchase. The table includes 
NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms on CRSP that have CRSP share codes 10 or 11 allocated for each year, and SIC 
codes beyond the ranges 4900–4949 and 6000–6999. The sample is for firms for which Computsat have common 
dividends, Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock, and earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat items 
21, 115 and 18). Using consumer price index to estimate real share repurchases in 2011, nominal share 
repurchases have been converted to 1985 dollars. For 1985, firms graded from 801 to 900 have 24 firms. 
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5.4. Separate earnings of the firms paying stock repurchase and those not 
paying 
As implemented in table 8, table 24 estimates the combination of cross-sectional earnings 
distribution of firms paying on share repurchase and those that do not pay. This table is 
separated in two panels. Panel A demonstrates collected earnings distribution for 1985 and 
2011, while panel B includes the collected distribution of an average of five years earnings that 
ended in the mentioned years. Panel A documents that, the number of payers with more than 
$500 millions of real earnings increased by 4 times from 23 firms in 1985 to 116 firms and the 
earnings of such firms expanded from $27.2 billion in 1985 to $228.5 billion in 2011.  Panel B, 
accordingly, demonstrates that number of payers in excess of $500 millions in earnings more 
than tripled from 1985 to 2011, while the value of share repurchases increased by $151.9 
billion over the same period of time. A positive relationship between the level of earnings and 
the percentage of firms that have cash payout via stock repurchase is documented in panels A 
and B. It seems that in both panels, this relationship is stronger in 2011 compared to what it 
was in 1985. For instance, only 26% of industrial firms with more than $100 million real 
earnings failed to have share repurchases in 2011, while in 1985, 80% of such firms were 
unsuccessful in having share repurchases. Moreover, the value of real earnings of payers in 
2011 is more than five times greater than it was in 1985 (from $50.1 billion to $295 billion), 
while such value for non-payers just increased by 180% over the same period (from$43.6 billion 
to $80.7 billion). In addition, aggregate share repurchases increased by $160 billion over 1985-
2011. All these observations are consistent with the findings of Grullon and Michaely (2002), 
and that industrial firms show a higher propensity now to pay cash out via share repurchase. In 
this sense, the main responsible factor may be attributed to the substantial increase in real 
earnings of industrial firms spent on share repurchases over 1985-2011. 
With regards to the relation between earnings and share repurchase, Table 25 presents that 
industrial firms with more than $500 million real earnings substantially increased their share 
repurchases from $14.4 billion to $137 billion over 1985-2011, which is almost three times 
greater than total share repurchases in 1985. In short, industrial firms with $500 million-plus 
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real earnings completed 68% of total share repurchases in 2011, while such proportion was 
35% in 1985. 
Overall, industrial firms with higher level of earnings ($500 million-plus) spent on the majority 
of share buy-back. Such observation may imply higher concentration of share repurchases over 
1985-2000. It is also observed that all categories with positive real earnings have higher 
propensity to share repurchase over 1985-2011, particularly top earners who have more 
tendency to stock repurchase. This may have ultimately led to a substantial increase in number 
of firms and value of share repurchases from 1985 to 2011. 
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Table 24; Real earnings (1985 dollars) for industrial firms in 1985 and in 2011: Sample partitioned into the firms pay cash for share repurchase and those 
don't pay for that.Panel A reports the distribution of real earnings for payers and nonpayers in 1985 and in 2011. Panel B reports the distribution of average 
real earnings over the five-year period The sample includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms on CRSP that have CRSP share codes 10 or 11 allocated for each 
year, and SIC codes beyond the ranges 4900–4949 and 6000–6999. The sample is for firms for which Computsat have common dividends, Purchase of 
Common and Preferred Stock, and earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat items 21, 115 and 18). Using consumer price index to estimate real 
share repurchases in 2011, nominal share repurchases have been converted to 1985 dollars.  
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Table 25; Real earnings (1985 dollars) and expenditure on share repurchases by industrial firms in 1985 and in 
2011.The samples consists of NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms on CRSP that have CRSP share codes 10 or 11 
allocated for each year, and SIC codes beyond the ranges 4900–4949 and 6000–6999. The sample is for firms for 
which Computsat have common dividends, Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock, and earnings before 
extraordinary items (Compustat items 21, 115 and 18). Using consumer price index to estimate real share 
repurchases in 2011, nominal share repurchases have been converted to 1985 dollars 
 
 
 
 5.5. The identity of the top payers in 2011 in terms of stock repurchases  
Table 26, which is ranked in descending order of share repurchases value, exhibits the 38 
industrial firms that paid the biggest amount of cash payout via stock repurchase in 2011. 
Amongst such firms, there are some well-established examples such as Exxon Mobil and 
General Electric, and also well-known technology companies, namely Microsoft and Dell. These 
38 firms supplied the majority of total cash payout (50.8%) in form of stock repurchases in 
2011, and their $91.7 billion increase in real value of share repurchases over 1985-2011 
accounted for 57.2% of total increase in share repurchases of all industrial firms. In addition to 
their dominance in aggregate share repurchases, these 38 firms also generated the majority of 
industrial real earnings with $147 billion in 2011 ($302.9 billion in 2011 dollars), which is 50.4% 
of aggregate industrial real earnings. They expanded their real earnings by $124.5 billion over 
1985-2011. Thirty three of the top 37 firms which paid the majority of stock repurchases in 
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2011 had more than $1 billion in real earnings. This may suggest that firms creating the high 
value of real earnings have the most shares in stock repurchasing.   
With regards to earnings concentration, not only is it present amongst firms with share 
repurchases, but also it is considerable amongst those with no share buyback. In this sense, 
table 27 records the 16 industrial firms that had no share repurchases with the highest earnings 
in 2011, listed in descending order. All these 16 firms generated more than $1 billion industrial 
real earnings in 2011 and accounted for the majority of all positive real earnings of non-payers. 
There are some firms such as Ford Motor, Lilly, and AT&T amongst these top non-payers that 
although they did not have any cash out on share repurchases, they paid $12.8 billion as 
dividends in 2011. In this regard, a number of firms like Apple, Berkshire Hathaway and also 
General Motors with very high level of real earnings did not pay dividends nor repurchase any 
share.  
Table 28 (See Appendix) demonstrates the 76 firms that generated more than $1 billion real 
earnings in 2011 without considering whether or not they paid cash on share repurchases. Sixty 
of these firms that paid 54% of aggregate stock repurchases in 2011 generated the majority 
(slightly more than 50%) of aggregate real industrial earnings the same year. 
Overall, these findings partially support the fact previously observed for level of earnings and 
paying dividends by DeAngelo et al. (2004). I observed that only a small number of industrial 
firms, 38 firms (about 1.4% of all industrial firms), paid a significant amount of cash payout via 
stock repurchases in 2011, having generated 50.4% of aggregate industrial real earnings. In 
terms of non-payers, although there are 16 firms with $1 billion-plus in real earnings, the total 
non-payers only supplied 22.1% of such earnings. However these top non-payers distributed 
12.1% of aggregate dividends in 2011. 
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Table 26; Share repurchase and earnings in 1985 and in 2011 for the 38 industrial firms that paid for the largest values of share repurchase in 2011.Using 
consumer price index to estimate real share repurchases in 2011, nominal share repurchases have been converted to 1985 dollars 
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Table 27; 2011 earnings for the 16 industrial firms had no share repurchase with the highest reported earnings. Using consumer price index to estimate 
real share repurchases in 2011, nominal share repurchases have been converted to 1985 dollars 
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6. Conclusion 
This research study presents evidence that, despite of previous findings demonstrating a 
reduction in number of industrial firms paying dividends after 1978 until up to 2000, the 
number of industrial dividend payers increased slightly by 1.87% from 855 in 2000 to 871 in 
2011. I observed that even though the aggregate earnings decreased dramatically between 
2000-2001 and also 2007-2008, aggregate dividends paid by industrial firms maintained a 
steady long-run uptrend in 2001 and 2008. In this sense, the total value of dividends paid in 
2001 was larger than dividends paid in each year before 1998, and the value of aggregate 
dividends in 2008 was greater than dividends supplied in each year before 2007. 
Dividends distributed by industrial firms is highly concentrated in 2011, as the top 200 dividend 
payers supplied 91.2% of total dividends. Though, this concentration slightly decreased by 1.4% 
compared to 2000, which reflected a negligible increase in the number of industrial dividend 
payers over 2000-2011. In this sense, the number of firms distributing a very large percent of 
dividends (firms with $100 million-plus real dividend) in the last decade has increased. Hence, 
top categories account for more firms. On the other hand, the number of firms with very small 
share in paying dividends (firms with less than $5 million real dividends) has decreased.  
In terms of the positive relation between the number of firms paying dividends and the level of 
their earnings, this relation seems stronger in 2011 than it was in 2000, as most firms with high 
levels of earnings contributed in dividend distribution. In this regard, the number of firms 
paying dividends with $500 million-plus and $100 million-plus in real earnings increased by 28 
and 89 firms respectively. The combination of these findings may explain the increase in 
number of industrial firms that pay dividends and substantial increase in aggregate dividends 
over 2000-2011. 
In 2011, 76 firms generated $1 billion or more in real earnings, which accounted for 64% of 
aggregate industrial earnings. Amongst such firms, 65 of them as dividend payers paid 68.4% of 
total dividends, whereas 49 companies in 2000 with the same level of real earnings generated 
69.2% of aggregate industrial real earnings. Moreover, 39 of these firms supplied 60.2% of real 
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dividends. Despite of the substantial increase in number of industrial firms with more than $1 
billion in real earnings (from 49 to 76) over 2000-2011, such firms had slightly less share in 
earnings generation, yet contributed more in dividend distribution.  
The following review acknowledges that a large majority of aggregate share repurchases are 
paid by dividend payers over 1985-2011. As such, the proportion of dividend payers paying on 
share repurchases to total industrial firms with share repurchases decreased, while its 
proportion to total dividend payers increased over 1985-2011. These observations may suggest 
that not only did considerable number of firms prefer to pay cash via stock repurchase rather 
than pay dividends, but also the majority (65.3%) of dividend payers contributed in share 
repurchasing. In this regard, 59.9% of total cash payout, including dividends and share 
repurchases together, is spent on share buyback in 2011 compared to 45.8% in 2000. 
Considering the industrial firms with expenditure on share repurchases in 1985 and 2011 in 
group of 100 firms, more concentration was observed in share repurchases amongst firms with 
high level of cash payout and less concentration for those with lower levels of paying cash. With 
regards to dividend payers contributing in share repurchases, the top dividend payers (with 
more than $100 million dividends) have the most significant role in share buy-back. Such firms 
repurchased 66% and 65% of total shares in 1985 and 2011 respectively. These observations 
imply that a very large portion of share buy-back is completed by top dividend payers. 
Accordingly, firms with high level of earnings that distributed a substantial portion of dividends 
also have a considerable performance in share repurchases. These findings are consistent with 
Grullon and Michaely (2002)’s findings, who documented that not only do young firms have 
more tendency to pay cash in form of stock repurchases, but also well-known and large firms 
paying dividends have a high propensity to spend cash on share repurchases.  
Ultimately, a positive relation between real earnings and stock repurchase was observed in this 
study. The increase in propensity of industrial firms in order to pay cash in form of share 
buyback over 1985-2011 is consistent with considerable growth in aggregate value of real share 
buyback over the same period by $160 billion. This may be due to the substantial increase in 
real earnings of industrial firms with share repurchases over 1985-2011. 
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Overall, my observations suggest of a higher concentration of cash payout via stock repurchases 
over 1985-2011. They also indicate that firms with higher level of earnings ($500 million-plus) 
had a substantial share buy-back. All categories with higher levels of real earnings have a higher 
propensity to buy back the shares over 1985-2011. As a consequence, there was a substantial 
increase in number of firms and value of share repurchases from 1985 to 2011. 
A significant drawback observed in the present study is the availability of data. Due to the 
unavailability of some proportions of the data, it was required to apply data taken from 
different sources, thus making the process of data gathering all the more difficult and time-
consuming. Furthermore, in terms of share repurchases, I had planned to use data related to 
common share repurchases, but since companies have announced their report in preferred 
share repurchases, I had no alternative but to apply data for common and preferred share 
repurchases. This in turn may have influenced the reliability of findings. 
There are certain issues of research directions that may be worthy of future investigation. The 
present investigation solely examined the performance of US industrial firms in dividend 
payments and share repurchases. Hence, it would be worthwhile examining how other 
powerful nations may contribute in paying dividends and share repurchases. This may provide 
us with an appreciation of whether, from a worldwide standpoint, concentration of industrial 
firms is positively correlated with dividends concentration and share repurchases concentration 
or not. 
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Appendixes: 
Table 13; Dividends and earnings in 1985, 2000 and in 2000 for the 62 industrial firms that paid the largest dividends in 2011. The table lists the 62 
industrial firms that paid the largest total dividends in 2011. Using consumer price index to estimate real dividends in 2000 and 2011, nominal dividends 
have been converted to 1985 dollars.  
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Table11; Dividends and earnings in 1985 and 2000 for the 37 industrial firms that paid the largest dividends in 
2000.The table lists the 37 industrial firms that paid the largest total dividends in 2011. Using consumer price 
index to estimate real dividends in 2000 and 2011, nominal dividends have been converted to 1985 dollars. 
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Table 14; Dividends and earnings in 1985, 2000 and in 2011 for the 76 industrial firms with at least $1 billion in real earnings in 2011.The table lists the 76 
industrial firms that report at least $1 billion in real earnings in 2011. Using consumer price index to estimate real dividends in 2000 and 2011, nominal 
dividends have been converted to 1985 dollars. 
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Table 15; Dividends and earnings in 1985, 2000 and in 2011 for the 49 industrial firms with at least $1 billion in 
real earnings in 2000.The table lists the 49 industrial firms that report at least $1 billion in real earnings in 2011. 
Using consumer price index to estimate real dividends in 2000, nominal dividends have been converted to 1985 
dollars. 
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Table 16; Share repurchase and earnings in 1985,2000 and in 2011 for the 76 industrial firms with at least $1 
billion in real earnings in 2011. Using consumer price index to estimate real share repurchases in 2011, nominal 
share repurchases have been converted to 1985 dollars 
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